Abstract. We introduce a short signature scheme based on the Computational DiffieHellman assumption on certain elliptic and hyperelliptic curves. For standard security parameters, the signature length is about half that of a DSA signature with a similar level of security. Our short signature scheme is designed for systems where signatures are typed in by a human or are sent over a low-bandwidth channel. We survey a number of properties of our signature scheme such as signature aggregation and batch verification.
Introduction
Short digital signatures are needed in environments with strong bandwidth constraints. For example, product registration systems often ask users to key in a signature provided on a CD label. When a human is asked to type in a digital signature, the shortest possible signature is needed. Similarly, due to space constraints, short signatures are needed when one prints a bar-coded digital signature on a postage stamp [47] , [42] . As a third example, consider legacy protocols that allocate a fixed short field for non-repudiation [1] , [29] . One would like to use the most secure signature that fits in the alloted field length.
The two most frequently used signatures schemes, RSA and DSA, produce relatively long signatures compared with the security they provide. For example, when one uses a 1024-bit modulus, RSA signatures are 1024 bits long. Similarly, when one uses a 1024-bit modulus, standard DSA signatures are 320 bits long. Elliptic curve variants of DSA, such as ECDSA, are also 320 bits long [2] . A 320-bit signature is too long to be keyed in by a human.
We propose a signature scheme whose length is approximately 170 bits and which provides a level of security similar to that of 320-bit DSA signatures. Our signature scheme is secure against existential forgery under a chosen-message attack (in the random oracle model), assuming the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is hard on certain elliptic curves over a finite field. Generating a signature is a simple multiplication on the curve. Verifying the signature is done using a bilinear pairing on the curve. Our signature scheme inherently uses properties of curves. Consequently, there is no equivalent of our scheme in F * q , the multiplicative group of a finite field. Constructing short signatures is an old problem. Several proposals show how to shorten DSA while preserving the same level of security. Naccache and Stern [42] propose a variant of DSA where the signature length is approximately 240 bits. Mironov [40] suggests a DSA variant with a similar length and gives a concrete security analysis of the construction in the random oracle model. Another technique proposed for reducing DSA signature length is signatures with message recovery [43] , [47] . In such systems one encodes a part of the message into the signature thus shortening the total length of the message-signature pair. For long messages, one can then achieve a DSA signature overhead of 160 bits. However, for very short messages (e.g., 64 bits) the total length remains 320 bits. Using our signature scheme, the signature length is always on the order of 160 bits, however short the message. We also note that Patarin et al. [45] construct short signatures whose security depends on the Hidden Field Equation problem. (See also [18] .)
Our signature scheme uses groups where the CDH problem is hard, but the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is easy. The first example of such groups was given in [31] and was used in [30] and [10] . We call such groups Gap Diffie-Hellman groups, or GDH groups for short. We show how to construct a signature scheme from GDH groups, prove security of the scheme, and show how to build GDH groups that lead to short signatures. The signature scheme resembles the undeniable signature scheme of Chaum and Pedersen [14] . Our signature scheme has several useful properties, described in Section 5. For example, signatures generated by different people on different messages can be aggregated into a single signature [11] . The signature also supports standard extensions such as threshold signatures and blind signatures [9] .
Notation. We use E/F q to denote an elliptic curve with coefficients in F q . For r ≥ 1, we use E(F q r ) to denote the group of points on E in F q r . We use |E(F q r )| to denote the number of points in E(F q r ).
GDH Groups and Bilinear Maps
Before presenting the signature scheme, we first review a few concepts related to bilinear maps and GDH groups. We use the following notation:
The group G T is described below. One can set G 1 = G 2 , but we allow for the more general case where G 1 = G 2 so that we can take advantage of certain families of non-supersingular elliptic curves as described in Section 4.3.
The proofs of security require an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ: G 2 → G 1 . When G 1 = G 2 and g 1 = g 2 one could take ψ to be the identity map. When G 1 = G 2 we will need to describe explicitly an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ: G 2 → G 1 . The map ψ is essential for security. To illustrate this, we give in the next section an example of a bilinear map that engenders an insecure signature scheme precisely because ψ does not exist.
With this setup we obtain natural generalizations of the CDH and DDH problems: When G 1 = G 2 these problems reduce to standard CDH and DDH problem. Next we define a Gap co-Diffie-Hellman (co-GDH) group pair to be a pair of groups (G 1 , G 2 ) on which co-DDH is easy but co-CDH is hard. We define the success probability of an algorithm A in solving the co-CDH problem on (
The probability is over the uniform random choice of a from Z p and h from G 1 , and over the coin tosses of A. We say that an algorithm A (t, ε)-breaks co-CDH on (G 1 , G 2 ) if A runs in time at most t, and Succ co-CDH A is at least ε. Here time is measured according to some fixed computational model-say, state transitions in a probabilistic (oracle) Turing machine.
Definition 2.1. Two groups (G 1 , G 2 ) are a (τ, t, ε)-co-GDH group pair if they satisfy the following properties:
• The group operation on both G 1 and G 2 and the map ψ from G 2 to G 1 can be computed in time at most τ .
Informally, we are only interested in co-GDH group pairs where τ is sufficiently small so that the co-DDH problem has an efficient solution, but t/ε is sufficiently large so that the co-CDH problem is intractable. Currently, the only examples of such GDH groups arise from bilinear maps [31] . We briefly define bilinear maps and show how they give GDH groups. It is possible that other constructions for useful GDH groups exist.
Let G 1 and G 2 be two groups as above, with an additional group G T such that |G 1 | = |G 2 | = |G T |. A bilinear map is a map e: G 1 × G 2 → G T with the following properties:
Definition 2.2. Two order-p groups (G 1 , G 2 ) are a (τ, t, ε)-bilinear group pair if they satisfy the following properties:
• A group G T of order p and a bilinear map e: G 1 × G 2 → G T exist, and e is computable in time at most τ .
Joux and Nguyen [31] showed that an efficiently computable bilinear map e provides an algorithm for solving the co-DDH problem as follows:
Consequently, if two groups (G 1 , G 2 ) are a (τ, t, ε)-bilinear group pair, then they are also a (2τ, t, ε)-co-GDH group pair. The converse is probably not true.
Signature Schemes Based on GDH Groups
We present a signature scheme that works on any co-GDH group pair (G 1 , G 2 ). We prove security of the scheme and, in the next section, show how it leads to short signatures. The scheme resembles the undeniable signature scheme proposed by Chaum and Pedersen [14] . Okamoto and Pointcheval [44] briefly note that gap problems can give rise to signature schemes. However, most gap problems will not lead to short signatures.
A signature σ is an element of G 1 . The signature scheme comprises three algorithms, KeyGen, Sign, and Verify. It makes use of a full-domain hash function H : {0, 1} * → G 1 . The security analysis views H as a random oracle [7] . In Section 3.2 we weaken the requirement on the hash function H .
Key generation. Pick random x
The public key is v ∈ G 2 . The private key is x. Signing. Given a private key x ∈ Z p , and a message M ∈ {0, 1}
The signature is σ ∈ G 1 . Verification. Given a public key v ∈ G 2 , a message M ∈ {0, 1} * , and a signature σ ∈ G 1 , compute h ← H (M) ∈ G 1 and verify that (g 2 , v, h, σ ) is a valid co-DiffieHellman tuple. If so, output valid; if not, output invalid.
A signature is a single element of G 1 . To construct short signatures, therefore, we need co-GDH group pairs where elements in G 1 have a short representation. We construct such groups in Section 4.
Security
We prove the security of the signature scheme against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model. Existential unforgeability under a chosen-message attack [28] for a signature scheme (KeyGen, Sign, and Verify) is defined using the following game between a challenger and an adversary A: The following theorem shows that the signature scheme is secure. Security of the scheme follows from the hardness of co-CDH on ( 1. Algorithm B runs the above algorithm for responding to H -queries to obtain a 
This completes the description of algorithm B. It remains to show that B solves the given instance of the co-CDH problem on (G 1 , G 2 ) with probability at least ε .
To do so, we analyze the three events needed for B to succeed: B succeeds if all of these events happen. The probability Pr[
The following claims give a lower bound for each of these terms.
Claim 1. The probability that algorithm B does not abort as a result of A's signature queries is at least
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume that A does not ask for the signature of the same message twice. We prove by induction that after A makes i signature queries, the probability that B does not abort is at least (1−1/(q S +1)) i . The claim is trivially true for i = 0. Let M i be A's ith signature query and let M i , w i , b i , c i be the corresponding tuple on the H -list. Then prior to issuing the query, the bit c i is independent of A's view-the only value that could be given to A that depends on c i is H (M i ), but the distribution on H (M i ) is the same whether c i = 0 or c i = 1. Therefore, the probability that this query causes B to abort is at most 1/(q S +1). Using the inductive hypothesis and the independence of c i , the probability that B does not abort after this query is at least
This proves the inductive claim. Since A makes at most q S signature queries the probability that B does not abort as a result of all the signature queries is at
Claim 2. If algorithm B does not abort as a result of A's signature queries then algorithm A's view is identical to its view in the real attack. Hence
Proof. The public key given to A is from the same distribution as a public key produced by algorithm KeyGen. Responses to H -queries are as in the real attack since each response is uniformly and independently distributed in G 1 . All responses to signature queries are valid. Therefore, A will produce a valid message-signature pair with probability at least ε. 
Claim 3. The probability that algorithm B does not abort after A outputs a valid forgery is at least 1/(q
S + 1). Hence, Pr[E 3 | E 1 ∧ E 2 ] = 1/(q S + 1).
Proof. Given that events E
Using the bounds from the claims above in (1) shows that B produces the correct answer with probability at least ε/e(q S + 1) ≥ ε as required. Algorithm B's running time is the same as A's running time plus the time it takes to respond to (q H + q S ) hash queries and q S signature queries. Each query requires an exponentiation in G 1 which we assume takes time c G 1 . Hence, the total running time is at most t + c G 1 (q H + 2q S ) ≤ t as required. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
The analysis used in the proof of Theorem 3.2 resembles Coron's analysis of the Full Domain Hash (FDH) signature scheme [16] . We note that the security analysis can be made tight using Probabilistic Full Domain Hash (PFDH) [17] , at the cost of increasing the signature length. The security reduction in Theorem 3.2 can also be made tight without the increasing signature length via the technique of Katz and Wang [32] .
Our signature scheme requires an algorithm for deciding DDH. In groups where a DDH-deciding algorithm is not available, Goh and Jarecki [27] show that it is still possible to construct a signature scheme based on CDH, at the cost of a substantially greater signature length.
The Necessity of ψ: G 2 → G 1 . Recall that the proof of security relied on the existence of an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ: G 2 → G 1 . To show the necessity of ψ we give an example of a bilinear map e: G 1 × G 2 → G T for which the co-CDH problem is believed to be hard on (G 1 , G 2 ) and yet the resulting signature scheme is insecure.
Let q be a prime and let G 2 be a subgroup of Z * q of prime order p with generator g. Let G 1 be the group G 1 = Z p with addition. Define the map e:
The map is clearly bilinear since e(ax, y b ) = e(x, y) ab . The co-CDH problem on (G 1 , G 2 ) is as follows: Given g, g a ∈ G 2 and x ∈ G 1 , compute ax ∈ G 1 . The problem is believed to be hard since an algorithm for computing co-CDH on (G 1 , G 2 ) gives an algorithm for computing discrete log in G 2 . Hence, (G 1 , G 2 ) satisfies all the conditions of Theorem 3.2 except that there is no known computable isomorphism ψ:
It is is easy to see that the resulting signature scheme from this bilinear map is insecure. Given one message-signature pair, it is easy to recover the private key.
We comment that one can avoid using ψ at the cost of making a stronger complexity assumption. Without ψ the necessary assumption for proving security is that no polynomial time algorithm can compute
Since ψ naturally exists in all the group pairs (G 1 , G 2 ) we are considering, there is no reason to rely on this stronger complexity assumption.
Hashing onto Elliptic Curves
The signature scheme needs a hash function H : {0, 1} * → G 1 . In the next section we use elliptic curves to construct co-GDH group pairs and therefore we need a hash function H : {0, 1} * → G 1 where G 1 is a subgroup of an elliptic curve. Since it is difficult to build hash functions that hash directly onto a subgroup of an elliptic curve we slightly relax the hashing requirement.
Let F q be a field of characteristic greater than 2. Let E/F q be an elliptic curve defined by y 2 = f (x) and let E(F q ) have order m. Let P ∈ E(F q ) be a point of prime order p, where p 2 does not divide m. We wish to hash onto the subgroup G 1 = P . Suppose we are given a hash function H : {0, 1} * → F q × {0, 1}. Such hash functions H can be built from standard cryptographic hash functions. The security analysis will view H as a random oracle. We use the following deterministic algorithm called MapToGroup to hash messages in {0, 1} * onto G 1 . Fix a small parameter I = log 2 log 2 (1/δ) , where δ is some desired bound on the failure probability.
MapToGroup H . The algorithm defines H : {0, 1} * → G 1 as follows:
, where i is represented as an I -bit string.
(a) Let y 0 , y 1 ∈ F q be the two square roots of f (x). We use b ∈ {0, 1} to choose between these roots. Choose some full ordering of F q and ensure that y 1 is greater than y 0 according to this ordering (swapping y 0 and y 1 if necessary).
MapToGroup H (M) = P M and stop; otherwise, continue with Step 4. 4. Otherwise, increment i, and go to Step 2; if i reaches 2 I , report failure.
The failure probability can be made arbitrarily small by picking an appropriately large I . For each i, the probability that H (i M) leads to a point on G 1 is approximately 1/2 (where the probability is over the choice of the random oracle H ). Hence, the expected number of calls to H is approximately 2, and the probability that a given message M will be found unhashable is 1/2 Algorithm F has access to a random oracle H : {0, 1} * → G 1 . It will use this to simulate the random oracle H : {0, 1} * → F q × {0, 1} that F uses. Algorithm F is also given a public key v, and a signing oracle for that key. Its goal is to output a forgery on some message under v.
Algorithm F runs F and responds to its oracle queries as follows. H -queries. Algorithm F keeps track (and indexes) all the unique messages M i for which F requests an H hash. When F asks for an H hash of a message w M i whose M i the forger F had not previously seen (and whose w is an arbitrary I -bit string), F must fix up row i of its matrix s before responding.
It scans the row
Note that m/ p is integer since p divides m. Furthermore, m/ p has an inverse modulo p since p 2 does not divide m and hence m/ p is relatively prime to p.
Pick a random point
If 
Building co-GDH Group Pairs with Small Representations
Using the Weil [34, pp. 243-245] and Tate [21] pairings, we obtain co-GDH group pairs from certain elliptic curves. We recall some necessary facts about elliptic curves (see, e.g., [34] and [50] ), and then show how to use certain curves for short signatures.
Elliptic Curves and the Weil Pairing
Our goal is to construct bilinear groups (G 1 , G 2 ) which lead to co-GDH group pairs as discussed in Section 2. Let E/F q be an elliptic curve. We first define a useful constant called the security multiplier of a subgroup P ⊆ E(F q ). Definition 4.1. Let q be a prime power, and let E/F q be an elliptic curve with m points in E(F q ). Let P in E(F q ) be a point of prime order p where p 2 m. We say that the subgroup P has a security multiplier α, for some integer α > 0, if the order of q in F * p is α. In other words,
The security multiplier of E(F q ) is the security multiplier of the largest prime order subgroup in E(F q ).
We describe two families of curves that provide α = 6. For standard security parameters this is sufficient for obtaining short signatures. It is an open problem to build useful elliptic curves with slightly higher α, say α = 10 (see Section 4.5).
Our first step is to define G 1 and G 2 . We will then describe a bilinear map e: G 1 ×G 2 → G T , describe an isomorphism ψ: G 2 → G 1 , and discuss the intractability of co-CDH on (G 1 , G 2 ).
Balasubramanian-Koblitz.
Let E/F q be an elliptic curve and let P ∈ E(F q ) be a point of prime order p with p q. Suppose the subgroup P has security multiplier α > 1, i.e. p q −1. Then a useful result of Balasubramanian and Koblitz [3] shows that E(F q α ) contains a point Q of order p that is linearly independent of P. We set G 1 = P and [50] and G 2 ) . When the Tate pairing induces a non-degenerate map on G 1 × G 2 , it can also be used to solve co-DDH on (G 1 , G 2 ) .
The Weil and Tate Pairings. With notation as above, let E[ p] be the group of points of order dividing p in E(F q α ). Then the group E[ p] is isomorphic to
The Trace Map. We present a computable isomorphism ψ: G 2 → G 1 , using the trace map, tr, which sends points in E(F q α ) to E(F q ). Let σ 1 , . . . , σ α be the Galois maps of
Proposition 4.2. Let P ∈ E(F q ) be a point of prime order p = q and let P have security multiplier α > 1. Let Q ∈ E(F q α ) be a point of order p that is linearly independent of P. If tr(Q) = O then tr is an isomorphism from Q to P .

Proof. Suppose R ∈ E(F q ) is a point of order p. If R is not in P then P and R generate E[ p] and therefore E[ p] ⊆ E(F q ). It follows that e(P, R) ∈ F *
q has order p since otherwise e would be degenerate on E [ p] . However, since α > 1 we know that p does not divide q −1 and consequently there are no elements of order p in F * q . Hence, we must have R ∈ P . It follows that all the points in E(F q ) of order p are contained in P . Since tr(Q) = O, we know that tr(Q) ∈ E(F q ) has order p and therefore tr(Q) ∈ P . Hence, tr is an isomorphism from Q to P .
Hence, when tr(Q) = O, the trace map is an isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 and is computable in polynomial time in α and log q as required. (G 1 , G 2 ) . The remaining question is the difficulty of the co-CDH problem on (G 1 , G 2 ). We review necessary conditions for CDH intractability. The best known algorithm for solving co-CDH on (G 1 , G 2 ) is to compute discrete log in G 1 . In fact, the discrete log and CDH problems in G 1 are known to be computationally equivalent given some extra information about the group G 1 [35] . Therefore, it suffices to consider necessary conditions for making the discrete log problem on E(F q ) intractable.
Intractability of co-CDH on
Let P be a subgroup of E(F q ) of order p with security multiplier α. We briefly discuss two standard ways for computing discrete log in P .
MOV:
Use an efficiently computable homomorphism, as in the MOV reduction [37] , to map the discrete log problem in P to a discrete log problem in some extension of F q , say F q i . We then solve the discrete log problem in F * q i using the Number Field Sieve algorithm [49] . The image of P under this homomorphism must be a subgroup of F * q i of order p. Thus we have p|(q i − 1), which by the definition of α implies that i ≥ α. Hence, the MOV method can, at best, reduce the discrete log problem in P to a discrete log problem in a subgroup of F * q α . Therefore, to ensure that discrete log is hard in P we want curves where α is sufficiently large to make discrete log in F * q α intractable. 2. Generic: Generic discrete log algorithms such as Baby-Step-Giant-Step and Pollard's Rho method [38] have a running time proportional to √ p log p. Therefore, we must ensure that p is sufficiently large.
In summary, we want curves E/F q where both a generic discrete log algorithm in E(F q ) and the Number Field Sieve in F * q α are intractable. At the same time, since our signature scheme has signatures of length log 2 q and public keys of length α log 2 q , we wish to keep q as small as possible.
Co-GDH Signatures from Elliptic Curves
We summarize the construction for co-GDH group pairs and adapt the signature scheme to use a group of points on an elliptic curve. The co-GDH group pair (G 1 , G 2 ) we use is defined as follows:
1. Let E/F q be an elliptic curve and let P ∈ E(F q ) be a point of prime order p where p q(q − 1) and p 2 |E(F q )|. 2. Let α > 1 be the security multiplier of P . We assume α < p. By Balasubramanian and Koblitz [3] there exists a point Q ∈ E(F q α ) that is linearly independent of P. It is easy to construct such a Q in expected polynomial time once the number of points in E(F q α ) is known. Since α > 1 we know that Q ∈ E(F q ). We ensure that tr(Q) = O. If tr(Q) = O replace Q by Q + P. Then Q + P is of order p, it is linearly independent of P, and tr(Q + P) = O since tr(P) = α P = O. 3. Set G 1 = P and G 2 = Q . 4. Since P and Q are linearly independent, the Weil pairing gives a non-degenerate bilinear map e: G 1 × G 2 → F * q α . It can be computed in polynomial time in α and log q. When the Tate pairing is non-degenerate on G 1 × G 2 it can also be used as a bilinear map. 5. Since tr(Q) = O the trace map on E(F q α ) is an isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 computable in polynomial time in α and log q.
With these subgroups G 1 , G 2 of the elliptic curve E/F q the signature scheme works as follows. Recall that MapToGroup H is a hash function MapToGroup H : {0, 1} * → G 1 built from a hash function H : {0, 1} * → F * q × {0, 1} as described in Section 3.2.
Key generation. Pick random x
R ←Z p , and compute V ← x Q. The public key is V ∈ E(F q α ). The private key is x. Signing. Given a private key x ∈ Z p , and a message M ∈ {0, 1} * , do: Verification. Given a public key V ∈ G 2 , a message M ∈ {0, 1} * , and a signature s ∈ F q do: 1. Find a y ∈ F q such that σ = (s, y) is a point in E(F q ). If no such y exists, output invalid and stop. 2. Ensure that σ has order p. If it does not, output invalid and stop.
The signature length is log 2 q . Note that during verification we accept the signature if e(σ, Q) −1 = e(R, V ). This is to account for the fact that the signature s ∈ F q could have come from either the point σ or −σ in E(F q ).
Security. By Theorem 3.2 it suffices to study the difficulty of co-CDH on (G 1 , G 2 ) . The best known algorithm for solving the co-CDH problem on (G 1 , G 2 ) requires the computation of a discrete log in G 1 or the computation of a discrete log in F * q α .
Using Non-Supersingular Curves over Fields of High Characteristic
It remains to build elliptic curves with the desired security multiplier α. In the next two sections we show curves with security multiplier α = 6. We begin by describing a family of non-supersingular elliptic curves with α = 6. This family is outlined by Miyaji et al. [41] . We call these MNT curves.
The idea is as follows: Suppose q = (2 ) 2 + 1 and p = (2 ) 2 − 2 + 1 for some ∈ Z. Then it can be verified that p divides q 6 − 1, but does not divide q i − 1 for 0 < i < 6. So, when p is prime, a curve E/F q with p points is likely to have security multiplier α = 6.
To build E/F q with p points as above we use complex multiplication [8, Chapter VIII]. We briefly explain how to do so. Suppose we had integers y, t and another positive integer D = 3 mod 4 such that
is an integer prime. Then the complex multiplication method will produce an elliptic curve E/F q with q + 1 − t points in time O(D 2 (log q) 3 ). The value t is called the trace of the curve.
We want a curve over F q with p points where q = (2 ) 2 + 1 and p = (2 ) 2 − 2 + 1. Therefore, t = q + 1 − p = 2 + 1. Plugging these values into (2) we get 4( (2 ) 2 + 1) = (2 + 1) 2 + Dy 2 which leads to
For a fixed D = 3 mod 4, we need integers , y satisfying the equation above such that q = (2 ) 2 + 1 is prime and p = (2 ) 2 − 2 + 1 is prime (or is a small multiple of a prime). For any such solution we can verify that we get a curve E(F q ) with security multiplier α = 6. Finding integer solutions , y to an equation of type (3) is done by reducing it to Pell's equation, whose solution is well known [51] . Table 1 gives some values of D that lead to suitable curves for our signature scheme. For example, we get a curve E/F q where q is a 168 bit prime. Signatures using this Table 1 . Non-supersingular elliptic curves for co-GDH signatures. E is a curve over the prime field F q and p is the largest prime dividing its order. The MOV reduction maps the curve onto the field F q 6 . D is the discriminant of the complex multiplication field of E/F q .
Together, Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 show that, for the relevant values of , groups on the curves E + /F 3 and E − /F 3 will have security multiplier α at most 6 (more specifically: α | 6). Whether the security parameter actually is 6 for a particular prime subgroup of a curve must be determined by computation.
Automorphism of E
+ , E − /F 3 6 . Both curves E + and E − have a useful automorphism that make the prime-order subgroups of E + (F 3 ) and E − (F 3 ) into GDH groups (as opposed to co-GDH group pairs). This fact can be used to shrink the size of the public key since it makes it possible for the public key to live in E(F 3 ) as opposed to E (F 3 6 ) .
The automorphism is defined as follows. For such that mod 12 is ±1 or ±5, compute three elements of F 3 6 , u, r + , and r − , satisfying u 2 = −1, (r + ) 3 +2r + +2 = 0, and (r − ) 3 + 2r − − 2 = 0. Now consider the following maps over F 3 6 : 
is a point of order p that is linearly independent of P.
Proof. See Case II on p. 326 of [50] .
Let E/F 3 be one of E + or E − and let P ∈ E(F 3 ) be a point of prime order p. Set G 1 = P , the group generated by P. Let ϕ: E(F 3 ) → E(F 3 6 ) be the automorphism of the curve from above. Define the modified Weil pairingê: 6 as follows: e(P 1 , P 2 ) = e(P 1 , ϕ(P 2 )) where e is the standard Weil pairing on E [ p] . By Lemma 4.5 we know that ϕ(P) is linearly independent of P. Therefore,ê is non-degenerate. It follows that G 1 is a GDH group; ϕ acts as a distortion map [52] , [31] . This has two implications for the signature scheme:
• Security of the signature scheme is based on the difficulty of the standard CDH problem in G 1 (as opposed to the co-CDH problem).
• Public keys are elements of G 1 and, hence, are shorter than public keys should the automorphism not exist.
Useful Curves. Some useful instantiations of these curves are presented in Table 2 . Note that we restrict these instantiations to those where is prime, to avoid Weil-descent attacks [24] , [25] , except for = 121. It has recently been shown that certain Weildescent attacks are not effective for this case [19] .
Performance. Galbraith et al. [23] and Barreto et al. [4] show that the Frobenius map on the curves E + , E − can be used to speed the computation of the Weil and Tate pairings on these curves. This results in a significant speed-up to the signature-verification algorithm. Consequently, the signature scheme using these curves is much faster than the scheme using the curves from the previous section. The Bad News. MOV reduces the discrete log problem on E + (F 3 ) and E − (F 3 ) to a discrete log problem in F * 3 6 . A discrete log algorithm due to Coppersmith [15] , [49] is specifically designed to compute discrete log in small characteristic fields. Consequently, a discrete log problem in F * 3 n is much easier than a discrete log problem in F * p where p is a prime of approximately the same size as 3 n . To get the security equivalent to DSA using a 1024-bit prime, we would have to use a curve E(F 3 ) where 3 6 is much larger than 1024 bits. This leads to much longer signatures, defeating the point of using these curves. In other words, for a fixed signature length, these supersingular curves lead to a signature with reduced security compared with the curves of Section 4.3.
An Open Problem: Higher Security Multipliers
With the curves of Section 4.3, a security multiplier of α = 6 is sufficient for constructing short signatures with security comparable with DSA using a 1024-bit prime. However, to obtain security comparable with DSA using a 2048-bit prime with α = 6 we get signatures of length 2048/6 = 342 bits. Elliptic curves with higher α, say α = 10, would result in short signatures when higher security is needed (such as 2048-bit discrete log security).
Let q be a large prime power, say, q > 2 160 . It is currently an open problem to construct an elliptic curve E/F q such that E(F q ) has α = 10 and E(F q ) has prime order. Several constructions [5] , [20] , [13] show how to build elliptic curves E such that E(F q ) has a given security multiplier α. However, the largest prime order subgroup of E(F q ) is much smaller than q. For example, the constructions of [5] and [20] give curves E/F q where the largest prime factor of |E(F q )| is of order √ q. Discrete log in such groups takes time approximately q 1/4 . Therefore, for a given security parameter, the resulting signatures are of the same length as DSA signatures. The constructions in [13] give curves where the largest prime factor of |E(F q )| is greater than √ q, but still substantially smaller than q. These curves result in signatures that are shorter than DSA, but longer than half the size of DSA. The open problem is to build elliptic curves E/F q with a given security multiplier α where E(F q ) has prime order. Such curves would provide signatures that are half the size of DSA for any given security level.
One could also build GDH groups of higher genus. Galbraith [22] constructs supersingular curves of higher genus with a "large" security multiplier. For example, the Jacobian of the supersingular curve y 2 + y = x 5 + x 3 has security multiplier 12 over F 2 . Since a point on the Jacobian of this curve of genus 2 is characterized by two values in F 2 (the two x-coordinates in a reduced divisor), the length of the signature is 2 bits. Hence, we might obtain a signature of length 2 where the security depends on computing CDH in the finite field F 2 12 . This factor of 6 between the length of the signature and the degree of the finite field is the same as in the elliptic curve case. Hence, this genus 2 curve does not improve the security of the signature, but does give more variety in curves used for short signatures. Discrete log on the Jacobian of these curves is reducible to discrete log in a field of characteristic 2 and consequently one must take Coppersmith's discrete log algorithm [15] into account, as discussed at the end of Section 4.4.
To obtain larger security multipliers, Rubin and Silverberg [48] propose certain Abelian varieties. They show that signatures produced using the curve of Section 4.4 can be shortened by 20%. The result is an n-bit signature where the pairing reduces the discrete log problem to a finite field of size approximately 2 7.5n . This is the only useful example we currently know of where the multiplier is greater than 6.
Extensions
Our signatures support threshold signatures and batch verification. Surprisingly, signatures from distinct people on distinct messages can be aggregated into a single convincing signature. We briefly survey these extensions here and refer to [9] , [53] , and [11] for a full description and proofs of security.
Aggregate Signatures
Common environments require managing many signatures by different parties on distinct messages. For example, certificate chains contain signatures on distinct certificates issued by various Certificate Authorities. Our signature scheme enables us to aggregate multiple signatures by distinct entities on distinct messages into a single short signature. Any party that has all the signatures can aggregate signatures, and aggregation can be done incrementally: two signatures are aggregated, then a third is added to the aggregate, and so on. See [11] for more applications.
Let (G 1 , G 2 ) be a bilinear group pair of prime order p. Suppose n users each have a public-private key pair. For i = 1, . . . , n, user i has private key x i ∈ Z p and public key
Suppose user i signs a message M i ∈ {0, 1}
* to obtain the signature
The aggregate of all these signatures is computed simply as σ ← σ 1 σ 2 · · · σ n ∈ G 1 .
Aggregate verification: We are given all public keys v 1 , . . . , v n ∈ G 2 , all messages M 1 , . . . , M n ∈ {0, 1} * , and the aggregate signature σ ∈ G 1 . To verify that, for all i = 1, . . . , n, user i has signed message M i , we test that 1. The messages M 1 , . . . , M n are all distinct, and 2. e(σ, g 2 
If both conditions hold, we accept the aggregate signature. Otherwise, we reject.
We refer to [11] for the exact security model and the proof of security. An attacker who can existentially forge an aggregate signature can be used to solve co-CDH on (G 1 , G 2 ).
We note that aggregate signature verification requires a bilinear map-a generic GDH group is apparently insufficient. Generic GDH groups are sufficient for verifying aggregate signatures on the same message by different people, or for verifying aggregate signatures on distinct messages by the same person.
Batch Verification
Suppose n users all sign the same message M ∈ {0, 1} * . We obtain n signatures σ 1 , . . . , σ n . We show that these n signatures can be verified as a batch much faster than verifying them one by one. A similar property holds for other signature schemes [6] .
Let (G 1 , G 2 ) be a co-GDH group pair of prime order p. Suppose user i's private key is x i ∈ Z p and his public key is v i = g
To verify the n signatures as a batch we use a technique due to Bellare et al. [6] :
1. Pick random integers c 1 , . . . , c n from the range [0, B] for some value B. This B controls the error probability as discussed below.
is a co-Diffie-Hellman tuple. Accept all n signatures if so; reject otherwise.
Theorem 3.3 of [6] shows that we incorrectly accept the n signatures with probability at most 1/B. Hence, verifying the n signatures as a batch is faster than verifying them one by one. Note that if all signers are required to prove knowledge of their private keys, then taking c 1 = · · · = c n = 1 is sufficient, yielding even faster batch verification [9] . A similar batch verification procedure can be used to verify quickly n signatures on distinct messages issued by the same public key.
Threshold Signatures
Using standard secret sharing techniques [38] , our signature scheme gives a robust t-outof-n threshold signature [9] . In a threshold signature scheme, there are n parties where each possesses a share of a private key. Each party can use its share of the private key to produce a share of a signature on some message M. A complete signature on M can only be constructed if at least t shares of the signature are available.
A robust t-out-of-n threshold signature scheme derives from our signature scheme as follows. A central authority generates a public-private key pair. Let x ∈ Z p be the private key and let v = g x 2 ∈ G 2 be the public key. The central authority picks a random polynomial ω ∈ Z p [X ] of degree at most t − 1 such that ω(0) = x. For i = 1, . . . , n, the authority gives user i the value x i = ω(i), its share of the private key. The authority publishes the public key v and n values u i = g x i 2 ∈ G 2 . When a signature on a message M ∈ {0, 1} * is needed each party that wishes to participate in signature generation publishes its share of the signature as σ i = H (M)
x i ∈ G 1 . Without loss of generality, assume users 1, . . . , t participate and generate shares σ 1 , . . . , σ t . Anyone can verify that share σ i is valid by checking that (g 2 , u i , H (M), σ i ) is a co-Diffie-Hellman tuple. When all t shares are valid, the complete signature is recovered as
where
(mod p).
If fewer than t users are able to generate a signature on some message M then these users can be used to solve co-CDH on (G 1 , G 2 ) [9] . This threshold scheme is robust: a participant who contributes a bad partial signature σ i will be detected immediately since (g 2 , u i , H (M), σ i ) will not be a co-Diffie-Hellman tuple. We note that there is no need for a trusted third party to generate shares of the private key. The n users can generate shares of the private key without the help of a trusted third party using the protocol due to Gennaro et al. [26] , which is a modification of a protocol due to Pedersen [46] . This protocol does not rely on the difficulty of DDH for security and can thus be employed on GDH groups.
Conclusions
We presented a short signature based on bilinear maps on elliptic curves. A signature is only one element in a finite field. Standard signatures based on discrete log such as DSA require two elements. Our signatures are much shorter than all current variants of DSA for the same security. We showed that the scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack (in the random oracle model), assuming the CDH problem is hard on certain elliptic-curve groups. More generally, the signature scheme can be instantiated on any GDH group or co-GDH group pair.
We presented two families of elliptic curves that are suitable for obtaining short signatures. The first, based on [41] , is a family of non-supersingular curves over a prime finite field. The second uses supersingular curves over F 3 . Both families of curves produce n-bit signatures and the discrete log problem on these curves is reducible to a discrete log problem in a finite field of size approximately 2 6n . Using the first family of curves, for 1024-bit security we get signatures of size approximately 1024/6 = 171 bits.
We expect that the first family of curves (the non-supersingular curves) will be the one used for short signatures: 171-bit signatures with 1024-bit security. As discussed at the end of Section 4.4, the second family of curves (the supersingular curve over F 3 ) should not be used for short signatures. The problem is that discrete log on these curves reduces to a discrete log in a finite field of characteristic 3 where Coppersmith's algorithm can be used.
Implementation results [23] , [4] indicate that the signature scheme performs well. Signature generation is just a simple multiplication on an elliptic curve and is faster than RSA signature generation. Verification requires two computations of the bilinear map and is slower than RSA signature verification.
In Section 4.5 we outlined an open problem that would enable us to get even better security while maintaining the same length signatures. We hope future work on constructing elliptic curves or higher genus curves will help in solving this problem.
